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TL;DR
Trezor confirmed that three Safe 5 hardware wallets bought through former reseller CryptoBilis contained an implant that captured information shown on the device screen, including recovery words. The company says firmware 2.13.1 blocks the implants it has found, but cannot protect a backup captured before the update; no owners have reported losing funds.
Trezor said on November 12 that it had confirmed hardware implants in three Safe 5 wallets bought through former Southeast Asian reseller CryptoBilis. The extra boards captured information shown on the devices, including wallet recovery words, according to Trezor; the company says firmware 2.13.1 blocks the implants it has identified, but cannot protect a backup captured before installation.
Trezor’s laboratory examined one device reported by a customer and identified two additional implanted Safe 5s from photographs sent by their owners. The devices were bought between August 20 and September 23, 2026, through CryptoBilis’s Tokopedia and Shopee stores or directly from the reseller. The finding concerns three individual Safe 5 units, not three different wallet models.
Trezor says each implant was an extra circuit board fitted between the wallet’s main board and its screen. It copied what appeared on the screen, including recovery words displayed during wallet setup or entered when restoring a wallet, and a passphrase if one appeared there. The implant encrypted the captured information and sent it over a mobile network to an attacker-controlled server, retaining it and trying again if it could not connect.
According to Trezor, the implant did not alter the device firmware or its Secure Element, the dedicated security chip. The company released firmware 2.13.1 on November 11 for the Safe 7, Safe 5, Safe 3 and Model T. Trezor says the update prevents the implants it has found from capturing information on updated devices. It also says no owner of the three confirmed devices has reported losing funds, and that 48 CryptoBilis customers have come forward while their devices are checked.
Trezor Safe 5 implant · how it works
What the hidden board copies, and what the fix stops
How Trezor describes the implant it found in three Safe 5 wallets bought from CryptoBilis, and what firmware 2.13.1 changes.
Inside the device (schematic)
mobile network
Step by step
- 1Recovery words appear on the screen, when a wallet backup is created or a wallet is restored
- 2The extra board copies them, and a passphrase if one is shown. Firmware and Secure Element stay unchanged
- 3It encrypts the data and sends it over the mobile network. No connection: it keeps the data and retries
- 4Firmware 2.13.1, released Nov 11: stops the implants found so far from capturing anything
Confirmed
3 Safe 5 devices, bought Aug 20 – Sep 23, 2026 from CryptoBilis
Being checked
48 CryptoBilis buyers came forward; no tampering found at other resellers in the region
Funds lost
None reported so far, Trezor says
Source: Trezor, “Our CryptoBilis investigation: what we found and what we’ve changed”, Nov 12, 2026; Trezor firmware changelog (2.13.1, released Nov 11, 2026). Schematic drawing, not the real board layout.
Graphic: Powered by Thorsten Meyer AI
Recovery Words Were Exposed at the Screen
The incident targets information that can give someone access to a wallet, rather than requiring a flaw in the wallet’s normal software. A recovery phrase can be used to restore a wallet elsewhere; if an attacker obtained it, the device owner could face a risk even if the wallet itself appeared to operate normally. Trezor says the implants also captured a passphrase when it appeared on the screen.
The reported design also complicates reliance on checks of firmware or the security chip alone. Trezor says those components were left unchanged, while the extra board sat on the connection to the screen. That means the company’s firmware protection addresses the identified implant’s ability to capture data, but a software update does not undo information already collected. Customers who may have used an affected device need to distinguish between preventing further capture and responding to a possibly exposed backup.
The confirmed count is three devices, and Trezor says none of their owners has reported a loss. That does not establish that captured information was used or that funds were taken. The case matters because it shows how a compromised supply route can create risk before a device reaches its buyer, despite the device’s security software and chip remaining unchanged.
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CryptoBilis Sales Prompted the Investigation
The case came to light amid reports involving another hardware-wallet brand. Trezor says Ledger began investigating fund losses among customers who bought devices from CryptoBilis on October 9. Ledger, in an October 15 statement, described the issue as “an attack on the distribution channel after the devices left our control” and said some of its devices had been physically tampered with. CryptoBilis was also an authorized Trezor reseller; Trezor says it removed the company from its reseller network on October 9.
On October 28, a Trezor customer in Indonesia reported an extra board in a Safe 5 purchased from CryptoBilis through Tokopedia. Trezor issued a customer warning on October 30 before its own laboratory had confirmed the report. It said it did not want to leave buyers exposed while waiting for testing. The company’s confirmation followed on November 12, after examination of the reported device and review of material from two other owners.
Trezor says other devices it has checked showed no evidence of tampering, and its checks of devices from other regional resellers found none either. It is working with SEAL 911, the Security Alliance’s emergency response service, and says it has cut its reseller network by about 80%. Those checks and the reported network reduction are company statements; the material provided does not give a full account of the review process.
““It only listens.””
— Trezor
The Scope of Exposure Is Still Being Checked
The confirmed finding remains limited to three Safe 5 devices. Trezor says 48 CryptoBilis customers have come forward and their devices are being checked, but it has not provided a final count of all units sold through the reseller or a completed tally of examinations. It is also not clear from the available information how many devices may have been modified beyond those identified.
Trezor says the implant sent captured data to a server controlled by the attackers, but the material provided does not say whether the operators accessed, retained or used recovery words or passphrases, or whether any customer funds were targeted. No loss has been reported by the owners of the three confirmed devices, according to the company; that statement does not resolve the status of every customer under review.
The source material also does not specify how the attackers obtained access to the devices, how long the implants were installed, or whether the mobile-network transmissions were successfully received. Trezor’s description that the update blocks the implants applies to the variants it has found, not necessarily to any undiscovered modification.
Customer Checks and Firmware Updates Continue
Trezor says it is checking devices reported by CryptoBilis customers and working with SEAL 911. Owners who bought a Safe 5 through CryptoBilis should follow the company’s current guidance and contact Trezor for a device check rather than assume that an apparently normal screen or unchanged firmware proves the unit was not modified. Trezor’s warning identifies the purchase channel as relevant to assessing exposure.
The company says firmware 2.13.1 is available for the Safe 7, Safe 5, Safe 3 and Model T, and that it blocks the implants found so far. Buyers should consult Trezor’s official instructions for installing the update. Because the update cannot protect a backup captured earlier, people with a confirmed or suspected affected device should seek Trezor’s guidance on protecting their funds and recovery information.
The next material update is likely to come as Trezor completes checks of the customers who have come forward and reports whether additional affected devices or losses are identified. Until then, the confirmed scope remains three Safe 5s, while the status of other CryptoBilis-bought devices is still under review.
Key Questions
How many Trezor wallets were confirmed to contain implants?
Trezor confirmed implants in three individual Safe 5 devices. The finding does not refer to three different models.
What information did the Safe 5 implant capture?
Trezor says it copied information shown on the device screen, including recovery words during setup or wallet restoration and a passphrase if one appeared on screen. It encrypted the data and attempted to send it over a mobile network.
Does firmware 2.13.1 protect a recovery phrase captured before the update?
No. Trezor says the update blocks the implants it has found from capturing information on updated devices, but cannot protect a backup captured before the update.
Have the three confirmed owners lost funds?
Trezor says none of the owners of the three confirmed devices has reported losing funds. The company has not said whether captured information was accessed or used.
What should a CryptoBilis customer do?
Trezor says 48 CryptoBilis customers have come forward and their devices are being checked. Customers who bought through the reseller should consult Trezor’s current guidance and contact the company about checking their device and protecting any potentially exposed backup.
Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com
